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1 introduction
In their seminal contribution, Milgrom and Weber (1982) introduce the affiliated values
model, which contains private and common value auctions as special cases, and employ
it to rank the three standard single-unit auction formats (first-price, Vickrey, and English
clock) in terms of strategic simplicity and sellers’ expected revenue. Among other results
they find that the open, ascending-bid (English) clock auction yields the highest expected
revenue to the seller. Moreover, they show that this auction format is strategically easy
to play, because strategies are simple stop rules, and equilibrium strategies are not overly
sensitive to bidders’ beliefs. Subsequently, that auction format has become preferred in
proposed applications, and subjected to extensive experimental testing.
Experimental tests of the English clock auction have been conducted for pure private, pure
common as well as for the general affiliated values model (see the surveys by Kagel, 1995,
and Kagel and Levin, 2002). Typically, these experiments observe significant deviations
from equilibrium, convergence towards a naive strategy, and conclude that bidders tend to
fall prey to the winner’s curse.
Unfortunately, if one employs a standard English clock auction in a laboratory, one can
observe only a small subset of players’ bidding strategies. Basing the experimental test of
the theory on that partial information may introduce a significant selection bias.
In an English clock auction bidders can only decide whether to stay active or quit the auc-
tion, while they observe the prices at which others have already quit the auction. Therefore,
a bidding strategy is a collection of quitting rules, each contingent on the prices at which
other players have quit the auction.
In the first stage of the auction, each bidder has a stop-rule that instructs him when to stop
as long as no other bidder stops before him. The first stage ends as soon as one bidder quits
the auction. Thereafter, bidders revise their quitting rules, using the information revealed
by that one bidder’s quitting price. This continues until only two bidders remain active,
and one of them stops, at which point the auction ends.
After the first stage of the auction, only the one (first–round) quitting rule of the bidder who
quits is observed, whereas the quitting rules of all other bidders remain invisible. Similarly,
in all later stages of the auction, only one of the quitting rules of all remaining bidders is
observed, whereas those of all other active bidders remain invisible.
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This indicates that using a standard English clock auction in an experimental test of the
theory gives rise to a selection bias, because the experimenter sees only the losing bids that
terminate each stage of the auction. And it suggests that one should find an equivalent
design of the English clock auction that makes all bids in all stages visible, and then carry
out a more reliable test of the theory that uses the data of all bids by all bidders.
The present paper is motivated by this critical assessment of the standard practice. In a
first step, we propose an equivalent format of the English clock auction that makes the
quitting rules of all bidders visible, and this in all stages of the auction. This format will be
described in detail in Section 2. In a second step, we apply that proposed auction format to
a three player version of the well–known “wallet auction” game, introduced by Klemperer
(1998) for two players. That auction is a pure common value auction. Third, we put that
wallet auction to an experimental test. During that experiment, we observe all quitting
rules of all players that are active in each stage of the game, starting from the first round,
where all bidders state a quitting rule, until the last round, when the two remaining bidders
state their final quitting rule, contingent upon the observed prices at which others have quit
already. These complete data are then used to test the theory, and also to examine to what
extent the standard testing procedure is subject to a selection bias that distorts the results
of the test. The latter is done by a counterfactual analysis of the auction results, in which
we use only those bids that would have been observed if one had used the standard format
of the English clock auction. Finally, we compare the factual with the counterfactual tests
and assess the nature and extent of the selection bias.
The article is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce our “proxy bidder augmented
English clock auction” that is equivalent to the standard English clock auction. In Section
3 we state all equilibria in linear strategies of Klemperer’s “wallet auction” for three players.
In Section 4 we introduce three “naive” strategies that may appeal to players if they do
not fully understand the game. Both the equilibrium and the naive strategies are used as
reference points in the subsequent experimental test. In Sections 5 and 6 we describe the
design and the results of the experiment. The paper closes with a discussion in Section 7.
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2 the proxy bidder augmented english clock auction
In an English clock auction, a strategy is essentially a complete book of instructions, each
page of which stipulates at which price a bidder wishes to quit the auction (provided no
other active bidder stops before), contingent upon the prices at which the bidders who are
no longer active have quit. On the first page of that book one finds the instruction for the
first stage of the auction, in which all bidders are active. The first stage ends as soon as one
bidder has quit the auction. The second page states the stop rule that applies when one
bidder has stopped, contingent upon the price at which that bidder stopped; it ends when
the second bidder has stopped. This continues in a similar fashion on the third, fourth and
higher numbered pages. The last page states the stop rule that applies in the event that
only one other bidder is active, contingent upon the history of quits and associated prices
of all the others who are no longer active. Of course, all pages of the book of strategy are
contingent upon the respective bidder’s private signal, in addition to the other information
that is revealed in the course of the auction.
If one runs such an English clock auction in real life or in a laboratory one cannot observe
bidders’ books of strategies. One cannot even observe all the stop rules that are played at
given private signals and given history of quits. The only bids that one can observe are
the bids of those who have quit the auction. Indeed, in each round one observes only the
lowest bid. Therefore, if there are n bidders one sees altogether only n − 1 bids out of a
total of
∑n
i=2 i =
(n−1)(n+2)
2
bids.
We modify the English clock auction by adding a neutral proxy bidder to whom the actual
bidding is delegated. The purpose of this modification is to make all the (n−1)(n+2)
2
bids
visible, without affecting behavior. In each stage of the auction, bidders must instruct that
proxy bidder at which reading of the price clock he shall stop, provided no other active
bidder has stopped before. We refer to these bids as proxy bids. As in a standard English
clock auction, a public price clock is then increased until it reaches the lowest of the proxy
bids and the corresponding bidder quits the auction. Then the next stage begins, where the
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remaining bidders instruct their proxy bidders afresh, and this continues, until the auction
ends. If two (or more) bidders state the same (lowest) proxy bid they all leave the auction
at this price. If in some stage all remaining active bidders state the same proxy bid, the
auction ends and the winner is chosen at random.
This auction mechanism is strategically equivalent to the standard English clock auction.
In an experiment, however, it allows us to observe the bids of all active players in each
stage and not only the losing bids.1
A crucial assumption on which our analysis of the bias in the standard design rests is
that subjects indeed use the same strategy in this format as in the standard English clock
auction. To maximize the likelihood that this assumption is warranted, we preserve the
ascending clock frame. In this respect the proxy bidder augmented English clock auction
differs from so-called “survival auctions” (see Kagel et al., 2004). In a survival auction,
in each stage bidders place bids and the lowest bidder is eliminated. Both formats are
strategically equivalent and extract the same information, but the survival auction does
not preserve the ascending clock frame. Hence it might be more difficult for bidders to
realize that it is equivalent to a standard English clock auction, which makes it appear less
likely that they follow the same strategy. Kagel et al. (2004) find, however, in a multi-unit
auction that with experienced bidders efficiency, revenues, and bidder profits do not differ
between survival auctions and standard ascending-clock auctions. This lends support to
our assumption that bidders use the same strategy in the proxy bidder augmented English
clock auction as in the standard English clock auction since our design is even closer to the
standard design than the survival auction.
Our approach further differs from Kagel et al. (2004) by focusing on the additional in-
formation gathered in the auction while they focus on practical advantages of the survival
1It would be preferable to obtain the complete strategies of all bidders, i.e., to extract also the bids that
losing bidders would have stated in subsequent stages if another bidder had dropped earlier. This would
require to employ the strategy method. This method is, however, cognitively quite demanding. Moreover,
if prices increase in small steps and valuations are drawn from a fine grid it is practically not feasible.
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compared to an ascending-bid auction. Thus, they advocate survival auctions as a practical
tool, whereas we see the main purpose of the proxy bidder augmented auction as a research
tool.
3 equilibria of the wallet auction
Consider the wallet auction, with three bidders. That auction is a pure common value
auction. Each bidder i ∈ {1, 2, 3}, privately observes a signal of the object’s value, denoted
by Xi, and the value of the object for sale is the sum of bidders’ signals, V (X1, X2, X3) :=∑n
i=1Xi. In one interpretation, the value of the object is equal to the sum total of all
bidders’ wallets, and a bidder’s signal is the content of his own wallet (thus, the name
“wallet auction”). However, one can also interpret it as the sale of an estate or a chain
store that consists of n assets, where each bidder has private information concerning a
different asset.
We denote the initial proxy bid function by β(x) and the adjusted proxy bid, adjusted after
observing one exit at price p, by b(x | p).
Proposition 1 (Symmetric Equilibrium) The English clock auction has a unique sym-
metric equilibrium:
β(x) = V (x, x, x) = 3x (1)
b(x | p) = V (x, x, β−1(p)) = 2x+ p
3
. (2)
Proof The wallet auction is a special case of the symmetric affiliated values model by
Milgrom and Weber (1982). There it was shown that the English clock auction has a
symmetric equilibrium. In that equilibrium, a bidder who has drawn signal x bids the
value of the object that would apply if all other active bidders had drawn the very same
signal x, and the signal of a bidder who has quit at price p is computed by using the
inference rule x = β−1(p). 
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However, the wallet auction has also many asymmetric equilibria (β1, β2, β3, bi, bj), where
bi(p1k), bj(p1k) denote the strategies of the two bidders who are still active in the last round
if the auction does not end in the first round, and p1k denotes the price at which bidder k
quits the auction in its first round.
Proposition 2 (Asymmetric Equilibria) The English clock auction has the following
asymmetric equilibria, (β1, β2, β3, bi, bj):
βi(xi) =αixi, αi > 0, i ∈ {1, 2, 3} (3)
where α1α2 > α1 + α2, α3 :=
α1α2
α1α2 − α1 − α2 (4)
bi(xi | p1k) =γixi + p1k
αk
, γi > 1 (5)
bj(xj | p1k) =γjxj + p1k
αk
, where γj =
γi
γi − 1 . (6)
Proof To prove that β := (β1, β2, β3) are mutual best replies, consider first bidder 3 and
assume bidders 1 and 2 play the candidate equilibrium strategies β1, β2. Suppose bidder
3 remains active in the first round until price p1, and wins in the first round at price p1,
which happens if and only if both rivals quit at p1. Then, his payoff is nonnegative, if and
only if p1 satisfies the following requirement:
pi3(x3, p1) = x3 +
p1
α1
+
p1
α2
− p1
≥ 0 ⇐⇒ p1 ≤ α1α2
α1α2 − α1 − α2x3 = α3x3.
(7)
This proves that β3 is a best reply to β1, β2.
Similarly, one can show that β1 is a best reply to β2, β3 and β2 to β1, β3.
Now consider the second stage game, played between two bidders, say i and j, in the event
when one and only one bidder, to whom we refer as bidder k, has quit during the first round
at some price p1k.
This is shown to be an equilibrium as follows: without loss of generality, we set k = 1 and
i = 2, j = 3; suppose bidder 2 remains active until bidder 3 quits at some price p23; then,
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his payoff, pi2, is nonnegative, if and only if p23 satisfies the following requirement:
pi2(x2, p11, p23) =x2 +
p11
α1
+
p23
γ3
− p11
α1γ3
− p23 ≥ 0
⇐⇒ p23
(
1− 1
γ3
)
≤ x2 + p11
α1
(
1− 1
γ3
)
⇐⇒ p23 ≤
(
γ3
γ3 − 1
)
x2 +
p11
α1
⇐⇒ p23 ≤ γ2x2 + p11
α1
(8)
Hence player 2 should quit at price p = γ2x2 +
p11
α1
, as asserted. Similarly, one can show
that player 3 should quit at the asserted price. 
Not all of these equilibria are plausible. Therefore, in the following we require that an
equilibrium be “dynamically consistent”, in the sense that if two bidders survive the first
round of the auction, they do not change their relative aggressiveness, i.e.
γi
γj
=
αi
αj
. (9)
This dynamic consistency requirement selects equilibria that have the following appealing
properties:
1. Bidders never raise their proxy bid after they observe the exit by another bidder
(this is plausible because if a weak bidder dropped out the remaining players have
to become less aggressive or if an aggressive player dropped out then his drop-out is
really bad news).
2. Dynamic consistency of equilibrium strategies in the sense that players’ strategies in
the second round never give rise to a proxy bid below (or equal to) the observed quit
price in the first stage;
3. As the price goes up in the second stage, observing that the rival has not yet quit,
is always informative about his underlying signal. From the fact that a player i has
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not quit in stage 1 until price p1k we already know that Xi ≥ p1kαi , so it could happen
that player j knows for sure that player i will not drop out in some interval [p1k, p],
but as will be shown below, assumption (9) assures that this does not happen.
In order to prove the first property, note first that (9) implies, since γj =
γi
γi−1
αj =
αiγj
γi
=
αi
γi − 1 (10)
Now after bidder k dropped out at p1k bidder i’s equilibrium proxy bid is (using αk =
αiαj
αiαj−αi−αj )
bi(xi | p1k) = γixi + p1k
αk
= γixi + p1k
αi − γi
αi
< γixi + αixi
αi − γi
αi
= αixi = βi(xi)
(11)
where the inequality results from fact that we know that bidder i’s initial proxy bid αixi
was higher than p1k, the observed drop out price of bidder k. Hence after observing the drop
out of bidder k, the other bidders will always reduce their proxy bid, as in the symmetric
equilibrium.
Concerning 2), since i ’s initial proxy bid αixi was higher than k’s drop-out price p1k, we
know that xi >
p1k
αi
. Now (11) yields for xi =
p1k
αi
that bi(xi | p1k) = p1k. Since bi(xi | p1k)
is strictly increasing in xi this implies that bi(xi | p1k) > p1k for all xi > p1kαi and hence
bidder i’s updated proxy bid after observing that bidder k dropped out at p1k will always
be strictly larger than p1k. Note that we know that αixi is strictly larger than p1k, because
if two bidders had chosen the same initial proxy bid, they would both drop at the same
price (in an alternative model, where only one of these bidders would be randomly selected
to drop out at this price, we would only obtain a weak inequality).
Concerning 3), note that after k dropped at p1k, bidder j knows that bidder i’s signal xi is
larger than p1k
αi
, but it can be arbitrarily close. From (11), we know that bi(xi, p1k) < αixi,
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so i’s updated proxy bid can be arbitrarily close to p1k and hence there is no interval where
bidder j can be sure that bidder i will not drop out. Thus when the price increases and
bidder i does not drop out this will always be informative to bidder j (who can, however,
not use this information, because he has already set his proxy bid).
4 plausible alternative strategies as reference points
It is frequently observed that in experiments subjects do not play Nash-equilibrium strate-
gies. In particular in common value auctions bidders often ignore crucial aspects of the
game and fall prey to the winner’s curse. Therefore, if one tries to identify a pattern of
behavior one should not only consider the Nash-equilibrium strategy, but also other strate-
gies that appear plausible for more or less sophisticated players to follow. These include
naive strategies that ignore the implications both of winning the auction and of the other
players not dropping out until a certain price, as well as strategies that take into account
the former but not the latter. We discuss here those that we consider most relevant.
We use these strategies as additional benchmarks to compare our experimental results to
and in particular to study whether bidding over time approaches any of these strategies.
We will in all cases denote the first stage proxy bid by β1 and the second stage proxy bid
by β2 and the price where the first stage ended by p1. Note that β2 depends on p1. For
notational simplicity we will ignore this below.
In the experiments, signals were independently drawn from a uniform distribution on [1,60].
This will be applied below to derive explicit predictions (and we round the expected value
to 30, which subjects who apparently wanted to use the expected value did as well).
4.1 Naive Strategy — Minimal Information Processing
The naive strategy ignores the implications of winning the auction and of the fact that at
any price the other bidders have not dropped out. The naive bid hence simply equals the
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expected value of the object given the information at the beginning of the stage. This is the
type of naive bidding that typically leads to a winner’s curse in a common value auction. In
an open ascending auction, however, such a bid is not necessarily too high, because it does
not only ignore that winning means that other bidders have a lower signal (if strategies are
symmetric) but also that the fact that they have not yet dropped out at the current price
implies a lower threshold for their signal. Obviously, a bidder should not conclude that the
signal of the bidder who dropped out first is smaller than 0 or larger than 60.
β1(x) =x+ E[2X] = x+ 60
β2(x) =x+ E[X] + β
−1
1 (p1)
=x+ 30 + min {60,max{0, (p1 − 60)}}
We call this strategy N1.
Apart from not being optimal, strategy N1 is not consistent, because if the first stage ends
at a price p1 > 90, the remaining bidders will conclude that the bidder who dropped out
has a signal p1− 60 > 30, while at the same time estimating the remaining rival’s signal to
equal 30. It seems implausible to infer that the remaining opponent has a lower signal than
the opponent who quit. More plausible versions of the naive strategy would reevaluate after
the first stage and estimate the remaining opponents signal to be either the maximum of
E[X] and β−11 (p1), or, even more reasonable, to be the expected value conditional on being
larger than β−11 (p1). While the latter is far too aggressive, it seems at least consistent in its
too extreme aggression. Hence we consider the alternative naive strategies
β1(x) =x+ E[2X] = x+ 60
β2(x) =x+max{E[X], β−11 (p1)}+ β−11 (p1)
=x+min {60,max{0, (p1 − 60), 30}}+min {60,max{0, (p1 − 60)}}
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which we call N2, and strategy N3
β1(x) =x+ E[2X] = x+ 60
β2(x) =x+ E[X|X > β−11 (p1)}+ β−11 (p1)
=x+
1
2
(60 + min {60,max{0, (p1 − 60)}}) + min {60,max{0, (p1 − 60)}}
= x+ 30 +
3
2
min {60,max{0, (p1 − 60)}}
All these strategies appear somewhat inconsistent because for small x they imply β2(x) < p1,
and hence that a bidder at the beginning of the second stage would wish to have dropped
out even earlier. A player who follows such a strategy would then obviously state β2(x) = p1
as his second stage proxy. Such a strategy is inconsistent, because it implies (for x < 30 in
N1 and N2 and for x < 20 in N3) that for all p1 > 60 the bidder would want to quit the
auction as soon as possible after the end of the first stage. Then it would obviously have
been better to state a lower first-stage proxy.
4.2 Slightly More Sophisticated Timid Strategy
Now suppose a bidder is sophisticated enough to know that his bid matters only in the
event of winning. This strategy still ignores that the game is dynamic, i.e. that at any
price a bidder can infer a lower bound for the signal of the other bidders. In essence this
strategy is thus too careful, it manages to avoid the winner’s curse, but it does not exploit
the information obtained in the course of the auction. Being the most careful strategy, we
call this the timid strategy T1. (One might also call this loss avoidance or winner’s curse
avoidance strategy, because the additional information that it takes into account is just
that which, if neglected, causes the winner’s curse).
β1(x) =x+ E[2X | X < x] = 2x
β2(x) =x+ E[X|X < x] + β−11 (p1)
=x+
x
2
+
p1
2
=
3
2
x+
p1
2
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As for the naive strategy, this strategy appears inconsistent, because p1
2
could be larger than
x
2
, suggesting that the bidder who had dropped out has a higher signal than the remaining
bidder. Hence we consider as above the variants
β1(x) =x+ E[2X | X < x] = 2x
β2(x) =x+max
{
E[X|X < x], β−11 (p1)
}
+ β−11 (p1)
=x+max
{x
2
,
p1
2
}
+
p1
2
which we call T2 and strategy T3
β1(x) =x+ E[2X | X < x] = 2x
β2(x) =x+ E[X|β−11 (p1) < X < x] + β−11 (p1)
=x+
x+ p1
2
2
+
p1
2
=
3
2
x+
3
4
p1
4.3 Sealed-Bid Style Strategy
In this case, bidders use in the first stage the strategy that would be appropriate in a
sealed-bid auction. Hence they take into account, that in winning the auction they can bid
as if the second highest signal equals their own (because they pay only the second highest
bid and hence in an equilibrium if the price equals the winner’s own bid this means that the
second highest signal equals his own). But the strategy is still too careful, because it ignores
that the dynamic price provides information about the lower bound of the third players
signal. In the second stage, the bid is, as in equilibrium, 2x + β−11 (p1), but it is actually
more aggressive than the equilibrium bid, because β−11 (p1) =
2
5
as opposed to β−11 (p1) =
1
3
in equilibrium. Since bids in the first stage are less aggressive than in equilibrium, bidders
infer a higher signal for the bidder who dropped out and hence bid more aggressively than
in equilibrium in the second period. We will refer to this strategy as strategy SB
13
β1(x) =2x+ E[X | X < x] = 5
2
x
β2(x) =2x+ β
−1
1 (p1)
= 2x+
2
5
p1
5 design of the experiments
Computerized experiments were run at CERGE-EI with students in the preparatory semester
for the PhD program. The experimental software was developed using z-Tree (Fischbacher,
1999).
We conducted two treatments: the non-robot treatments, where three subjects interacted
repeatedly and the robot-treatments where each subject was matched with two simulated
bidders that played the symmetric equilibrium strategy (in the latter case the bidders were
informed that the simulated bidders followed the same strategy and that this strategy could
be part of an equilibrium without being informed that this was the symmetric equilibrium
strategy). In the non-robot treatment, 21 subjects participated in two sessions. The 12
participants in the robot treatment were recruited from the 21 original participants. At the
time of recruitment, they were informed that a similar auction would be played, without
giving details at this point. The purpose of the robot treatment was to study whether
experienced subjects manage to find the equilibrium strategy in a much simpler setting after
we observed that no group was able to reach the equilibrium in the non-robot treatment.
In both treatments 40 auctions were conducted. In the non-robot treatment we employed
a fixed-matching scheme, the three bidders in one group stayed together for the whole 40
auctions.
In the instructions (see the corresponding author’s homepage) we used the frame of an estate
consisting of three assets to be auctioned off. Signals denominated in the experimental
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currency “points” were drawn independently from a uniform distribution on the integers in
[1,60], hence the value of the estate was restricted to [3,180].2
Each auction was conducted in two stages. First all bidders stated their first-stage proxy
bids, restricted to be integers in [0,180]. Then a price clock, starting at 0 increased in integer
steps of 1 per 0.3 seconds until the lowest of the first-stage proxy bids was reached. The
other two bidders were then informed about the drop-out price p of the first bidder. Then
they entered their second-stage proxy-bids, restricted to the integers in [p, 180]. The price
clock increased again from p until the lower of the second-stage proxy-bids was reached.
Then the auction was over and the remaining bidder obtained the estate for the last reading
of the price clock. Hence he made a profit equal to the value of the estate (i.e. the sum
of the three bidders’ signals) less the price where the auction ended. If two bidders stated
the same proxy bid in the first stage, they both quit the auction when the price reached
that bid and the auction was over. If all remaining bidders in either stage entered the same
proxy bid, the winner was randomly selected. Only the winner of the auction was informed
about the value of the estate and his profit.
The sessions took altogether between 150 and 180 minutes. At the end of the experiments,
earnings were converted into Czech Crowns at a rate of 1 point = 1 CZK and paid in
cash on site. Average earnings were 461 CZK (about $ 16.50 or 14.40 Euro at the time of
the experiments) in the non-robot treatment (including a show-up fee of 200 CZK and an
additional flat payment of 200 CZK that was paid because the sessions took longer than
estimated) and 473 CZK (about $ 16.70 or 14.70 Euro at the time of the experiments) in
the robot treatment (including a show-up fee of 200 CZK and an additional flat payment
of 100 CZK) with minimum earnings of 140 and 380, respectively, and maximal earnings
of 850 and 570, respectively.3
2We choose a minimal signal of 1 instead of 0 in order to be able to distinguish an equilibrium bid from
a “friendly” drop-out at 0 in case a bidder draws the minimal signal.
3Note that in the Czech Republic these corresponds to rather substantial hourly wages. The subjects
were living on stipends of about 6500 CZK per months at the time of the experiment.
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6 results of the experiments
6.1 Non-Robot Treatment
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the non-robot treatment, namely for both stages the
equilibrium bid for the given signals, the average actual bid and the average bid relative
to the equilibrium bid as well as the shares of bids equal to, larger, and smaller than
the equilibrium bid. We see that average first-stage bids are substantially larger than the
equilibrium bid, while average second-stage bids are only slightly above the equilibrium.4
Furthermore, we note that in both stages hardly any bids equal the equilibrium bid. In line
with observations for the average bids, first-stage proxy bids are more frequently above the
equilibrium than below, while second-stage proxy bids are equally often larger or smaller
than the equilibrium bid.
Stage 1 Stage 2
Average Equilibrium Bid 90.22 92.52
Average Bid 107.07 95.26
Average Bid Relative to Equilibrium Bid 118.7% 103%
bid = equilibrium bid 1.2% 0.2%
bid > equilibrium bid 59.5% 49.8%
bid < equilibrium bid 39.3% 50%
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics for Non-Robot Treatment
In the detailed analysis below, we start by analyzing whether subjects exhibit learning
trends towards the (symmetric) equilibrium prediction. Then we study learning trends
towards other plausible strategies. Finally, we compare our results to the results we would
4Note, however, that second-stage equilibrium bids are computed under the assumption that first stage
bids equal equilibrium bids. Given that actual first-stage bids are higher (this holds also for the minimal
first-stage bids which are the only ones that the remaining bidders could observe), second-stage bids should
actually be smaller.
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have obtained in a standard English clock auction, i.e. if we had observed only the lowest of
the first- and second-stage proxy bids. This comparison rests on the assumption that our
subjects would have indeed followed the strategy corresponding to their proxy bids also in
a standard English clock auction without bidding agents, i.e. that they would have dropped
out in each stage at that price at which they instructed their proxy bidders to drop out in
our setting.
It can happen, either as a result of the inconsistencies of the naive strategies or as a result of
very aggressive bids in the first stage, that a strategy predicts β2(x) < p1 (note that except
for the naive strategies, this cannot happen if the bidder followed the respective strategy in
the first stage). Hence a bidder would choose his second-stage proxy bid equal to p1. When
we study learning trends towards the different strategies, we exclude all such observations,
because if we include them a combination of a very aggressive bid in the first stage and an
immediate drop-out in the second stage would support that the bidder plays consistently
with these strategies in the second stage. Hence if bidders just become more aggressive over
time in the first stage and then drop immediately (or at least early) in the second stage,
this would appear like a learning trend towards various second stage strategies. In general,
the analysis of second-stage bids with respect to trends towards any strategy should be
considered with care, because these strategies crucially depend on beliefs about the other
bidders’ strategies in both the first and second stages and all strategies above are based on
the assumption that bidders believe that others follow the same strategy. It does not appear
completely implausible, however, that a bidder assumes that other bidders are following,
for example, the naive strategy while he plays a best reply towards these strategies. This
leads to a large amount of possible strategies that we cannot all analyze.
We run multi-level random-effects panel regressions. These take into account the depen-
dence of the observations on the different levels (subject and group). Logistic regressions
are performed when the regressed variable is a dummy.5
5Standard panel regressions that take the subject as independent observation and ignore the dependence
of observations within a group yield nearly identical results. If we take the group as independent observation,
17
6.1.1 Learning Trends Towards Plausible Strategies
Result 1 Both first- and second-stage proxy bids do not converge towards the equilibrium
bids. Subjects do, however, clearly learn qualitative equilibrium behavior.
Result 1 is supported by the panel regressions. The absolute difference between the observed
and predicted first-stage proxy bid increases over time, though not significantly (p = 26.7%).
The same holds for the second-stage proxy bids (p = 58.9%). Hence if anything, there is a
learning trend away from the equilibrium. The overall number of bids that conform exactly
to the equilibrium prediction is with 10 out of 840 in the first stage and only 1 in the second
stage very low.
An important qualitative property of the (symmetric as well as asymmetric) equilibria is
that second-stage proxy bids are always smaller than first-stage proxy bids. Subjects clearly
learn this property. The incidence of bid pairs where the second-stage proxy bid is smaller
than the first-stage proxy bid increases significantly over time (p < 0.1%), and that of bid
pairs where the second-stage proxy bid is larger decreases significantly (p < 0.1%). In fact,
in the first 10 auctions 22.8% bid pairs are increasing, 72.1% decreasing, and 5.1% constant,
whereas in the last ten auctions the percentages are 5.7%, 91.4%, and 2.9%, respectively.
Indeed the share of decreasing bid pairs increases in all seven groups from the first ten to the
last ten auctions and hence this increase is significant according to a Wilcoxon signed-rank
test (p = 1.8%, two-sided).
We also analyzed whether the relative bid decrease (= (β1− β2)/β1), given that the bidder
lowers his or her bid from the first to the second stage at all, or the difference between
the relative bid decrease and the corresponding value for the equilibrium bids changes over
time. There is no discernible time trend.
Result 2 Bidding in the first stage becomes more aggressive over time.
the results are qualitatively the same.
18
The incidence of first-stage bids above the equilibrium increases significantly over time
(p = 0.1%), while that of bids below the equilibrium decreases (p = 0.4%). Furthermore, the
difference between the observed and equilibrium first-stage proxy bids increases over time
(p < 0.1%). In the second stage, however, time trends concerning over- and underbidding
of the equilibrium are far from significant.
Result 3 First-stage proxy bids tend away from the timid strategy as well as from the
sealed-bid strategy over time.
The absolute difference between the observed and timid first-stage bids increases signif-
icantly over time (p < 0.1%) as does the absolute difference to the sealed-bid strategy
(p = 0.3%). This effect is clearly consistent with result 2, given that bids are on average
already higher than the timid and sealed-bid strategy in the first auctions and that these
strategies are more timid than the equilibrium strategy.
Result 4 Second-stage proxy bids tend towards the naive strategy N1.
The absolute difference between the observed and naive second-stage bids decreases sig-
nificantly over time (p = 4.3%). In contrast, in the first stage it increases insignificantly
(p = 26.5%). It appears doubtful that bidders really “learn” strategy N1 in the second
stage, given that behavior in the first stage is rather far from, and does not approach, N1.
The behavior of the bidders who dropped out in the first stage, however, was approaching
the naive strategy (see Result 7 below). Hence bidding in the second stage according to N1
is less absurd than it may appear at a first glance (since a crucial input in the second stage
is not the bidder’s own first-stage strategy, but whether the other bidders have followed N1
in the first stage).
Result 5 Second-stage proxy bids tend away from the timid strategies T2 and T3.
The absolute difference between observed second-stage bids and T2 or T3 increases signifi-
cantly over time (p = 0.2%, p = 3.3%, respectively). Given that first-stage proxy bids tend
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away from the timid strategies, this appears to be reasonable, because these strategies are
based on the assumption that other bidders follow the timid strategy in the first stage, a
belief that is less and less justified over time. Initial play, however, is quite close to the
timid strategy.
Due to the increasing aggressiveness of bids, profits are decreasing and losses become more
likely over time, though these effects are not significant. Incurring a loss has an insignificant
negative effect of the incidence of bidding above the equilibrium in the next period.
Finally, one might wonder whether groups tend to move qualitatively towards asymmetric
equilibria. An important property of asymmetric equilibria is that in the first stage one
or two bidders bid above the symmetric equilibrium prediction and the other(s) below
the symmetric equilibrium and in the second stage one bidder bids above and one bidder
below the symmetric equilibrium bid. The incidence of groups satisfying these criteria even
decreases marginally over time both in the first and in the second stage. Hence there is no
learning trend towards qualitative asymmetric equilibrium behavior.
6.1.2 Counterfactual Analysis
We now compare our above results to the results we would have obtained in a standard
English clock auction. In order to do this, we restrict the analysis to the lowest of the first-
and second-stage proxy bids, which would be the observed drop-out prices in a standard
clock design.
While in a standard English clock auction one could also use the observed drop-out price
as a lower threshold of the bid of the remaining bidders when estimating bidding functions,
this would still not allow us to detect crucial results. Most importantly, with a standard
design we could never observe whether a bidder really lowers his intended drop-out price
from the first to the second stage within an auction. We could only indirectly address this
issue by trying to estimate bidding functions and then inferring whether bidders learn to
place relatively lower bids in the second stage.
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To be able to detect any clear learning trend would require a very large number of obser-
vations. Our design, in contrast, allows for a straightforward test, because we can observe
the actual adjustment of intended drop-out prices within an auction.
Result 6 In a standard English clock auction, learning of qualitative properties of the
equilibrium strategy could not have been observed.
As discussed above, a crucial qualitative property of the equilibrium strategy is that second-
stage proxy bids are smaller than first-stage proxy bids and our subjects increasingly con-
form to this property. In a standard English clock auction, this learning trend could not
have been observed, because first-stage and second-stage bids are never both observed for
the same subject.
If we restrict the statistical analysis to the lowest proxy bids, which correspond to the
bids that would have been observed in a standard English clock auction without proxy
bids, the absolute difference between the observed and the equilibrium bids in the first
stage is decreasing over time, though far from significantly (p = 45.8%). Including in the
regression for the whole data set an interaction term period × “lowest” where “lowest” is
a dummy for the lowest proxy bid, yields a deeper understanding. The effect of the period
is (marginally) significantly positive (p = 5.2%), while the interaction effect is (marginally)
significantly negative (p = 8.0%). Hence for those bids that would not have been observed
in a standard English clock auction, there is a significant trend away from the equilibrium,
while this effect is significantly weaker (to an extent that the trend is reversed) for the bids
that would have been observed.6
Figure 1 shows the development of the average of all first-stage proxy bids as well as the
average of the losing (i.e. lowest) first-stage proxy bids relative to the symmetric equilibrium.
Neither all nor the lowest bids appear to approach the equilibrium.
6Note, however, that even the lowest first-stage proxy bids are substantially (10.6%) higher that the
equilibrium bids for the given signals.
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Result 7 The first-stage bids that would have been observed in a standard English clock
auction tend towards the naive strategy.
Figure 2 shows the development of the average of all first-stage proxy bids as well as the
average of the losing (i.e. lowest) first-stage proxy bids relative to the naive strategy. We see
that while the average of all bids are consistently above the naive strategy, the lowest bids
appear to approach the naive strategy from below. This picture would have been obtained
in a standard English clock auction given the same strategies.
This result is supported by a regression restricted to the lowest first-stage proxy bids, where
the absolute difference between these bids and the naive strategy bids decreases (marginally)
significantly (p = 7.8%) over time. Including in the regression for the whole data set
the interaction term period × lowest yields a significantly positive effect of the period
(p = 2.3%), while the interaction effect is significantly negative (p = 2.1%). Hence the
proxy bids that would not have been observed in a standard English clock auction tend away
from the naive strategy, while the interaction effect is significantly negative to an extent
that the effect is completely reversed. Furthermore, in a standard English clock auction
the tendency of first-stage bids away from the timid strategy would be underestimated in a
standard English clock auction, since the effect would have been only marginally significant
(p = 8.9%) and the tendency away from the sealed-bid strategy would be missed completely,
being insignificant (p = 57.1%).
Result 8 The second-stage bids that would have been observed in a standard English clock
auction do not show the clear tendencies towards N1 or away from T2 and T3.
Restricting the analysis to the lower second-stage bid, there is no time trend in the difference
between observed strategies and N1 (p = 82.4%). Similarly, the tendency of second-stage
bids away from T2 would be underestimated, being only marginally significant (p = 6.2%),
and that away from T3 would be completely missed, being insignificant (p = 79%).
To summarize, under the assumption that bidders would have bid according to the proxy
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bids that they placed in our experiment also in a standard English clock auction, the results
in the latter would have been misleading because they would have suggested that bidders
“learn” the naive first-stage strategy whereas the analysis for the complete data set shows
that they clearly do not. Interestingly, in the second stage, this result is reversed, i.e. our
results suggest learning of the naive strategy, which would not have been observed in the
standard format. Most importantly, we observe clear learning of qualitative aspects of the
equilibrium that could not be observed in the standard format. Hence our subjects appear
to be more rational than a standard English clock auction might have suggested.
One potential reason why subjects have learned to lower their second-stage proxy bids
compared to their first-stage proxy bid might be that placing high first-stage proxy bids
is relatively risk-free because the probability that the auction ends after the first stage (if
both other bidders place the same first-unit proxy bid) is very low and dropping out at
the beginning of the second stage possible. Hence subjects could at a low expected cost
stay in until the second stage to gather additional information.7 Behaving along these lines
leads to overall more aggressive bids in the first stage and to lowering of bids in the second
stage. Two subjects followed this strategy to the extreme, by usually stating the maximal
admissible bid of 180 in the first stage and often placing a second-stage bid equal to the
price where the first-stage ended, attempting to drop out immediately. This strategy did
not do well and hurt the other bidders in the group.8
7If, however, two bidders are following this strategy, then the likelihood that they will both try to drop
out at the beginning at the second stage and thus one of them makes a loss is quite high. The problem is
obviously more severe if all three do.
8One might suspect that these two subjects drive the results of the increased aggressiveness of bidding.
This is, however, not the case. If we include the two groups from the analysis this does not change the
significance of the results with respect to increased overbidding on the first unit or the increase in the
frequency of decreasing bid pairs or decrease of increasing bid pairs.
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6.2 Robot Treatment
Table 2 shows descriptive statistics for the robot treatment. We see that again average first-
stage, but not second-stage proxy bids are substantially higher than equilibrium bids for
the given signals, although overbidding in the first stage is less severe than in the non-robot
treatment. We also note that the number of bids equal to the equilibrium is remarkably
high in this treatment, an observation we get back to below.
Stage 1 Stage 2
Average Equilibrium Bid 95.79 86.49
Average Bid 106.13 89.83
Average Bid Relative to Equilibrium Bid 110.8% 103.9%
bid = equilibrium bid 26% 23.1%
bid > equilibrium bid 44.6% 46.2%
bid < equilibrium bid 29.4% 30.8%
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics for Robot Treatment
The 12 subjects who participated in the treatment where they were matched with two ro-
bot bidders had taken part in the non-robot treatment before. Hence some of them have
interacted in a group before and they might have discussed the experiment in the days
between experiments. Hence the observations in the robot treatment are not statistically
independent and our statistical analysis that treats them as independent should be con-
sidered with care and rather be seen as illustrative. As far as learning within the robot
treatment is considered, the assumption of independence, might however, not be considered
too problematic, because bidders did not interact within this treatment and hence learning
occurred independently. Since each “group” contains only one human subject, each subject
constitutes an independent observation and hence we use standard panel regressions taking
the dependence of observations for each subject into account.
Had we initially planned to run the robot treatments, we would have provided subjects
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with code numbers to be able to match their behavior in the no robot treatment with their
behavior in the robot treatment. Unfortunately, this was not done as the robot treatment
was inspired by the results from the first treatment.
6.2.1 Learning Trends Towards Plausible Strategies
Among the 12 bidders, 5 learned to play the equilibrium strategy after several auctions. As
was revealed in discussions after the experiment, however, this learning was partly due to a
coincidence. Since signals were integers, all first-stage proxy bids by the robot bidders were
divisible by three. Some bidders noticed this, inferred correctly that this might indicate
that robots bid three times their signal in the first stage, calculated the strategy that the
robots must have used in the second stage given the feedback they received about the to-
tal valuation and the drop-our prices and confirmed their hypothesis in the next auctions.
They then copied this strategy because they were informed that the robot’s strategy formed
part of an equilibrium (though they were not informed that it was a symmetric equilib-
rium, this seemed a reasonable guess).9 These subjects who copy the equilibrium strategy,
drive the results towards equilibrium. It is, however, potentially more interesting to study
the behavior of the remaining subjects (and of the copying subjects before they find the
equilibrium strategy) to see whether they exhibit learning trends towards the equilibrium
or away from the equilibrium. Hence we also present an analysis restricted to the bids that
are not exactly equal to the equilibrium.
Result 9 The incidence of exact equilibrium bids in both stages clearly increases over time.
However, for those subjects who do not copy the equilibrium strategy, there is no clear trend
towards the equilibrium.
9That 5 out of 12 subjects inferred the strategy of the robot bidders correctly in reasonably short time
is quite impressive even in spite of the integer bids. Our subjects were, however, clearly mathematically
more skilled than the average subject in an economics experiment.
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The incidence of exact equilibrium bids increase over time (p < 0.1%) in both stages and
the absolute difference between observed and equilibrium bids decreases over time both in
the first (p < 0.1%) and in the second stage (p = 3.5%). However, the effect is far from
significant (p > 15%) if bids that exactly match equilibrium bids are excluded. Hence
the learning trend seems to be almost exclusively driven by the players who understand
and copy the strategy of the robot bidders and not by gradually learning to play a best
reply to the robots’ strategy. Similarly, qualitative equilibrium behavior, i.e. lower second-
stage than first-stage bids, increases significantly over time (p = 0.6%) but this effect is
not significant in the set of bid pairs that do not match the equilibrium (p = 15.3%).
Note, however, that subjects had learned to lower their second-unit bids already in the first
treatment, so that there was only little room for learning in this respect. In fact, already
in the first 10 auctions in 82.9% of bid pairs the second stage bid was lower than the first-
stage bid, while the reverse was true in only 9.8% of bid pairs and in the last 10 auctions
the respective shares are 95.3% and 0% (the incidence of larger second-stage bid indeed
decreases significantly, p = 3.0%, even in the data set restricted to non-equilibrium bids).
The share of decreasing bid pairs is already 1 for 5 out of 12 subjects in the first 10 auctions
and increases in the last 10 auctions only for 5 subjects. Hence according to a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test the increase in the share is not significant (p = 23.4%, two-sided).
We also analyzed whether the relative bid decrease (= (β1− β2)/β1), given that the bidder
lowers his or her bid from the first to the second stage at all, or the difference between the
relative bid decrease and the corresponding value for the equilibrium bids changes over time.
The latter decreases significantly over time (p < 0.1%), but this effect is again exclusively
driven by the subjects who do found the equilibrium strategy. Excluding these, the effect
disappears (p = 76.7%).
Result 10 Bidding in both stages becomes more aggressive over time. Bidding above the
equilibrium becomes less frequent over time. The latter effect, however, is driven by the
bidders who copy the equilibrium strategy.
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In the first stage, the incidence of proxy bids below the equilibrium significantly decreases
over time, both for the whole data set (p < 0.1%) and excluding bids that are exactly equal
to the equilibrium (p = 1.7%). Also, the difference between the bids and the equilibrium
bid increases over time (p < 0.1%, both including and excluding equilibrium bids). The
incidence of proxy bids above the equilibrium, however, decreases significantly (p = 0.2%),
but increases among the bids not equal to equilibrium bids (p = 1.7%). Hence while all
bidders become less timid (underbid less), those who did not copy the equilibrium strategy
become more aggressive (overbid more).
The results are comparable in the second stage. Bidding below equilibrium decreases sig-
nificantly both including (p < 0.1%) and excluding equilibrium bids (p = 6.2%). The
difference between the bids and the equilibrium bids increases over time (p < 0.1%, both
including and excluding equilibrium bids). The incidence of proxy bids above the equilib-
rium, however, decreases significantly (p = 7.6%), but increases among the bids not equal
to equilibrium bids (p = 6.2%). Hence also in the second stage all bidders become less
timid (underbid less), and those who did not find the equilibrium become more aggressive
(overbid more).
Result 11 In the first stage bids move away from the naive strategy and the timid strategy
over time.
The absolute difference between the first-stage proxy bids and the naive bids clearly in-
creases over time (p < 0.1%), also if equilibrium bids are excluded (p = 0.8%). The
absolute difference between first-stage bids and the timid strategy increases significantly
over time (p = 4.5% if all bidders are included, p < 0.1% if those exact equilibrium bids
are excluded).
Result 12 In the second stage bids move away from the naive strategies and the timid
strategies T1 and T2.
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Similarly in the second stage, the absolute difference between bids and all naive bids (N1,
N2, and N3) clearly increases over time (p < 1%), also if equilibrium bidders are excluded
(p < 1%). The absolute difference between bids and the timid strategy T1 increases over
time (p = 2.2%), also if equilibrium bids are excluded (p = 0.1%). The increase in the
difference between bids and T2 is significant only if equilibrium bids are excluded (p = 1.1%,
otherwise p = 25.8%).
The probability of losses is increasing over time, though far from significantly. Bidding
above the equilibrium in the first stage decreases significantly if a loss has been incurred
before (p < 0.1%), but losses have virtually no effect on overbidding in the second stage.
Both profit and the deviation of the profit from the equilibrium profit virtually do not
change over time.
6.2.2 Counterfactual Analysis
As in the no-robot treatment, the qualitative learning of the equilibrium in the sense of
lower second-stage bids could not have been observed in a standard English clock auction.
However, in both stages the incidence of equilibrium bids increases significantly (p < 0.1%)
also among the lowest proxy bids. Learning trends towards the equilibrium might have
been even overestimated because if the analysis for the absolute difference between the bid
and the equilibrium bid is restricted to the lowest proxy bids, the coefficient for period is
about twice as large as for the complete data set.
Result 13 In a standard English clock auction, the increased aggressiveness of bidders in
the second stage would not have been observed.
Restricting the analysis to the lowest second-stage proxy bids, the incidence of bids above
the equilibrium decreases significantly for the whole data set (p = 0.2%), but it also de-
creases, though insignificantly (p = 49%) among the non-equilibrium bids. Including an
interaction term for the period and a dummy for the lowest proxy bid yields no effect of
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period but a (marginally) significantly negative interaction effect (p = 6.9%). Excluding
the equilibrium bids, period has a clear positive effect (p = 0.7%), but the interaction effect
is negative (p = 1.6%). Hence the bids that would not be observed in a standard ascending
auction become clearly more aggressive, while those that would be observed, do not at all.
Similarly, for the lowest proxy bids, the increase in the difference to the equilibrium bid is
only marginally significant (p = 7.5%) and not significant if equilibrium bids are excluded
(p = 19%).
Result 14 In a standard English clock auction, it would not have been observed that bids
in the first stage move away from the naive strategy and the timid strategy. In addition, a
trend towards the sealed-bid strategy would have been observed.
In the first stage the increase in the absolute difference between the lowest proxy bids and
the naive bids is far from significant (p = 71.7%) and the absolute difference even decreases
if equilibrium bids are excluded (p = 43.5%). The difference between the lowest proxy bid
and the timid strategy even decreases insignificantly over time (p = 24.7%) and increases
only insignificantly if equilibrium bids are excluded (p = 24.6%).
The difference between the lowest proxy-bid and the sealed-bid strategy decreases signif-
icantly over time (p = 0.5%), but there is no clear trend in the difference between all
first-stage proxy-bids and the sealed-bid strategy (p = 24.4%). If equilibrium bids are ex-
cluded, then there is a slight tendency away from the sealed-bid strategy (p = 9.9%), but
this effect would not have been observed in a standard English clock auction (p = 74.5%).
Result 15 In a standard English clock auction, it would not have been observed that bids
in the second stage move away from the timid strategies.
There is no time trend in the difference between the lowest second-stage bids and T1, both
including (p = 95.4%) and excluding (p = 44.2%) equilibrium bids. The increase in the
difference between the lowest second-stage bids and T2 is marginally significant only if
equilibrium bids are excluded (p = 9.5%, otherwise p = 81.8%).
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7 discussion
We have proposed an equivalent format of the English clock auction, the proxy bidder
augmented English clock auction. This auction format makes the quitting rules of all
bidders visible, and this in all rounds of the auction. In an application to a three player
wallet auction, we have demonstrated that it allows us to detect learning of qualitative
equilibrium behavior that could not have been observed in a standard English clock auction.
Furthermore, we show by comparison with a counterfactual analysis that the standard
design would have implied wrong conclusions based on our data. A critical assumption
on which our conclusions rest is that subjects recognize that the proxy bidder augmented
English clock auction is strategically equivalent to a standard English clock auction and
hence follow the same strategy in both formats. The results by Kagel et al. (2004) suggest
that this assumption is justified, but further research should provide evidence on this. Given
that the assumption is supported, we advance the proxy bidder augmented English clock
auction as an alternative to standard English clock auctions that yields more, and less
biased, information.
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Figure 1: Development over time of the average of all …rst-stage proxy bids
(FirstProxRelEqu) as well as the losing (i.e. minimal) …rst-stage proxy bids
(MinFirstProxRelEqu), both relative to the symmetric equilibrium strategy bid.
First Stage Proxy Bids and Naive Strategy
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1 4 7 10 13 16 19 22 25 28 31 34 37 40
Period
B
id
s 
R
el
at
iv
e 
to
 N
ai
ve
 S
tr
at
eg
y
Naïve
FirstProxRelN
MinFirstProxRelN
Figure 2: Development over time of the average of all …rst-stage proxy bids
(FirstProxRelN) as well as the losing (i.e. minimal) …rst-stage proxy bids (Min-
FirstProxRelN), both relative to the naive strategy bid.
Appendix (Not for Publication)
Instructions (Non-Robot Treatment)
You and two other participants are bidding for an estate that shall be liquidated, in an
open, ascending bid, clock auction with bidding agents.
The estate consists of three assets: A, B, and C. The total value of the estate is equal
to the sum of the values of these three assets.
At the time of the bidding, no bidder knows the value of the estate. However, each
bidder is familiar with one of these assets, and knows its value, but does not know the value
of the other two assets. This information is exclusive, i.e. each bidder knows the value of a
di¤erent asset. All of this is common knowledge, i.e. all bidders have the same instructions.
For example, you may know the value of asset A, but not that of B and C; whereas
another bidder knows only the value of B, and the third bidder knows only the value of C.
Each bidder thus receives one signal of the value of the estate and the total value of the
estate is equal to the sum of the three signals.
The auction is a “clock” auction in the sense that a price clock indicates that you can
either bid the current reading of the clock or quit the auction. If a bidder quits the auction,
he cannot return.
The auction is “open” in the sense that you are informed if one of the other bidders has
quit the auction, and at which clock reading this had occurred.
The auction is “ascending bid” in the sense that the price clock moves up, at a …xed
rate of 1 point per 0.3 seconds, starting at a price of 0.
Instead of bidding incrementally, you will use a bidding agent, who does the
bidding for you. All you need to do is to instruct your bidding agent at which
reading of the price clock he should stop bidding up.
The auction proceeds in two rounds. In the …rst round, after being informed about
your signal (the value of one of the assets A, B, or C), you are asked to instruct your
bidding agent to stop bidding up for you at a certain reading of the price clock. This price
is called your …rst-round proxy bid. When all three bidders have chosen their …rst-round
proxy bids, the price clock starts increasing. Your agent will keep on bidding until the price
reaches your proxy bid and will then quit the auction.
When the price clock has reached the lowest of the proxy bids of the three bidders, the
bidder who had placed this proxy bid has quit the auction, and the …rst round is closed.
The auction will then proceed to the second and …nal round. The two remaining bidders
are informed that the …rst bidder quit the auction and at which price he quit. They will
then place new proxy bids, called their …nal-round proxy bids. These can be equal
to or di¤erent from their …rst-round proxy bids. The …rst-round proxy bids of the two
remaining bidders become irrelevant. After both remaining bidders have chosen their …nal-
round proxy bids, the price clock will resume increasing, starting from the price at which
the …rst round ended. Hence the …nal-round proxy bids cannot be lower than the lowest of
the three …rst-round proxy bids.
The …nal round of the auction ends as soon as one of the remaining bidders quits the
1
auction, that is when the price reaches the lower of the two …nal-round proxy bids. The
price clock stops when this bidder quits; the last reading of the price clock is called the
winning bid. The remaining active bidder is the winner; he or she receives the value of the
estate (the sum of the values of the assets A, B, and C, or the sum of the signals of all three
bidders), and pays a price equal to the winning bid.
If two bidders choose the same proxy bid in the …rst round, both will quit the auction
when the price reaches this proxy bid and the remaining bidder will be awarded the estate
for this price. If all three bidders choose the same proxy bid, they will all quit the auction
when the price reaches this proxy bid. One bidder will then randomly be chosen and will
be awarded the estate for this price. If the two remaining bidders choose the same proxy
bid in the …nal round, they will both quit the auction when the price reaches this proxy
bid. One bidder will then randomly be chosen and will be awarded the estate for this price.
The following round-by-round description summarizes the procedure.
Round 0: Each bidder is privately informed about the value of one of the assets A,
B, or C; each bidder is informed about the value of a di¤erent asset. This information is
displayed on the computer screen of each bidder, and not visible to the other bidders.
Round 1: Each bidder chooses his or her …rst-round proxy bid. The price clock starts at
0. The price clock increases until it reaches the lowest of the three proxy bids. This bidder
is eliminated.
Round 2: The remaining two bidders are informed that the …rst bidder quit the auction.
They choose their …nal-round proxy bids. The price clock starts at the price at which the
…rst bidder quit. The price clock increases until it reaches the lower of the two …nal-round
proxy bids. The auction ends and the remaining active bidder is awarded the estate for the
price at which the auction ended.
When the auction ends, the winning bidder will be informed about the price at which
the second bidder quit, which is equal to the price he or she has to pay for the estate, the
total value, his or her resulting pro…t and his or her total pro…t so far. The other bidders
will not be informed about the total value of the estate.
The parameters of the Auction
Overall, 40 auctions will be conducted. You will always interact with the same two
other bidders. You will not know who these two other bidders are and you will also not
be informed about this after the experiment. No other participant will be informed about
your earnings.
You will start with an initial capital of 200 points. Note that you can make losses
during the course of the experiment. You can, however, always bid in a way that prevents
losses.
In each auction, each bidder’s signal will be drawn independently from the integers in
the interval [1,60] points. Each integer is equally likely. Note that since the other bidders’
signals are drawn from the same distribution, if your signal is x then you know the minimal
possible value of the estate is x+2 ¤ 1 = x+2 and the maximal possible value of the estate
is x+ 2 ¤ 60 = x+ 120:
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Since the maximal possible value is 3 ¤ 60 = 180; the maximal permitted proxy bid is
180. Negative or non-integer proxy bids are not allowed.
At the end of the experiment, your points will be converted into Czech crowns at a rate
of
1 point = 1 CZK
and will be paid in cash immediately.
Examples
A few examples to illustrate (note that these examples shall not suggest any reasonable
behavior of the bidders, they only illustrate the mechanism):
1. Let the signals of the three bidders be x1 = 23; x2 = 45; x3 = 12: Assume they choose
…rst-round proxy bids b1 = 88; b2 = 36; b3 = 39:
Hence the …rst round ends at p = 36: Bidder 2 is eliminated. Bidders 1 and 3 place
their …nal-round proxy bids, which are not allowed to be smaller than 36. Assume
the bids are bf1 = 77; b
f
3 = 45: The …nal stage hence ends at p = 45 and bidder 1 is
awarded the estate for p = 45: Since the total value of the estate is x1 + x2 + x3 =
23 + 45 + 12 = 80; bidder 1 makes a pro…t of 80 ¡ 45 = 35:
2. Let the signals of the three bidders be x1 = 15; x2 = 2; x3 = 18: Assume they choose
…rst-round proxy bids b1 = 48; b2 = 16; b3 = 32:
Hence the …rst round ends at p = 16: Bidder 2 is eliminated. Bidders 1 and 3 place
their …nal-round proxy bids, which are not allowed to be smaller than 16. Assume
the …nal-round proxy bids are bf1 = 41; b
f
3 = 41: The …nal stage hence ends at p = 41:
The estate is then randomly allocated to one of bidders 1 and 3 for p = 41: Since the
total value of the estate is x1 + x2 + x3 = 15 + 2 + 18 = 35; this bidder makes a loss
of 35 ¡ 41 = ¡6:
3. Let the signals of the three bidders be x1 = 45; x2 = 55; x3 = 12: Assume they choose
…rst-round proxy bids b1 = 50; b2 = 100; b3 = 50:
Hence the …rst round and the whole auction ends at p = 50: Bidder 2 is awarded the
estate for p = 50: Since the total value of the estate is x1+x2+x3 = 45+55+12 = 112;
bidder 2 makes a pro…t of 112 ¡ 50 = 62:
4. Let the signals of the three bidders be x1 = 4; x2 = 33; x3 = 21: Assume they choose
…rst-round proxy bids b1 = 99; b2 = 99; b3 = 99:
Hence the …rst round and the whole auction ends at p = 99: The estate is then
randomly allocated to one of the bidders for p = 99: Since the total value of the
estate is x1 + x2 + x3 = 4 + 33 + 21 = 58; this bidder makes a loss of 58 ¡ 99 = ¡41:
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Screen shots
The following screen shots show examples of what you will see during the course of the
auction.
Shot 1: Receiving the Private Signal and Entering the First-Round Proxy Bid
You learn that one of the three assets of the auctioned estate has value 42. Hence you know
that the total value of the estate is at least 44 and at most 162. You are asked to enter
your …rst-round proxy bid.
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Shot 2: Price Clock in the First Round
You are informed again about your private signal while the price increases. The current
price is 14. In the …nal round of the auction, the screen looks the same.
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Shot 3: Feedback after the First Round and Entering the Final-Round Proxy
Bid
You are informed that one bidder has quit the auction at a price 33, i.e. the lowest proxy
bid in the …rst round was 33. You are asked for your …nal-round proxy bid, which cannot
be lower than 33.
6
Shot 4: Feedback after Winning the Auction
You are informed that the other remaining bidder in the …nal round quit the auction at a
price 58. Hence you win the estate for a price 58. You are also informed about the total
value of the estate which is 72 and your resulting pro…t 72¡58 = 14: Your total pro…t after
the …rst auction of course equals the pro…t from this auction. Note, however, that your
total capital now is 214, because you start with an initial capital of 200.
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Quiz
Please answer the following questions. They serve only to check that you completely un-
derstood the instructions. Wrong answers have no consequences.
1. Assume that bidders 1,2, and 3 submit the …rst-round proxy bids
b1 = 127; b2 = 59; b3 = 19:
(a) What happens when the price reaches 19?
(b) Which is the smallest possible proxy bid in the …nal round?
(c) Assume that the …nal-round proxy bids are
b1 = 133; b2 = 41:
What happens when the price reaches 41?
(d) Suppose the bidders’ signals were
x1 = 23; x2 = 32; x3 = 36:
Compute bidder 1’s pro…t
2. Assume that the bidders submit …rst-round proxy bids
b1 = 42; b2 = 42; b3 = 68:
(a) what happens when the price reaches 42?
(b) Suppose the bidders’ signals were
x1 = 23; x2 = 2; x3 = 14:
Compute bidder 3’s pro…t
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Instructions (Robot Treatment)
The experiment you will participate in today is identical to the experiment which you
participated in last week, with one substantial di¤erence. Attached …nd the instruc-
tions for last week’s experiment if you need to refresh your memory about the rules of the
auction.
The di¤erence from last week’s experiment is that this time the two other bidders are
not other participants in the experiment, but two simulated bidders. These bidders
are programmed to follow a particular strategy throughout the experiment. Both
will follow the same strategy. They will not change their strategy during the course of the
experiment.
These strategies are not sophisticated in the sense that they do not try to understand
the strategy you are playing and to choose a best reply to your strategy. Hence you cannot
"teach" the simulated bidders. The strategies are, however, "reasonable", in particular they
form part of an equilibrium. That is, if you choose a best reply to these strategies, they
will also be best replies to your strategy.
The auction will be run exactly in the same way as last week’s auction. In particular,
signals for the bidders will be randomly drawn and the strategies of the simulated
bidders condition only on their own signal and what they observe during the course of
the auction. Since signals will be randomly drawn for the simulated bidders, their proxy
bids can di¤er from one auction to another although they follow the same strategy in each
auction.
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